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Abstract. How do high and low skilled migration affect fertility and human
capital in migrants’ origin countries? This question is analyzed within an
overlapping generations model where parents choose the number of high
and low skilled children they would like to have. Individuals migrate with
a certain probability and remit to their parents. It is shown that a brain
drain induces parents to have more high and less low educated children.
Under certain conditions fertility may either rise or decline due to a brain
drain. Low skilled emigration leads to reversed results, while the overall
impact on human capital of either type of migration remains ambiguous.
Subsequently, the model is calibrated on a developing economy. It is found
that increased high skilled emigration reduces fertility and fosters human
capital accumulation, while low skilled emigration induces higher population
growth and a lower level of education.
Keywords: Migration, human capital, fertility.
JEL Classification: F22, J13, J24.
∗IRES, Universite´ catholique de Louvain. e-mail: marchiori@ires.ucl.ac.be
†CREA, Universite´ du Luxembourg, e-mail: patrice.pieretti@uni.lu
‡CREA, Universite´ du Luxembourg, e-mail: benteng.zou@uni.lu
1 Introduction
At the world level, the number of international migrants rose from 76 million in 1960
to 175 million in 2000, but considering population growth the world share of migrants
remained quite stable (2.5% in 1960 to 2.9% in 2000). Nevertheless, by making countries
increasingly interdependent, globalization, rising income inequality, enhanced transporta-
tion technology, deacreasing tansportation costs, and stronger demographic disparities
between developed and developing countries play in favor of a reinforcement of interna-
tional migration in the next decades. Moreover, the fact that developed countries are
ever more attractive for workers from developing regions is documented by the share of
international migrants in developed countries that rose from 4% in 1970 to 8% in 2000 (see
UN 2003 and IOM 2005). This is even more true for skilled emigration which is expected
to be increasingly important, since immigration policies in migrants’ host countries tend
to be more and more skilled-biased. Docquier and Marfouk (2006) report that between
1990 and 2000, the augmentation in the number of skilled immigrants in OECD countries
was about 64%, while it was only about half as much for unskilled immigrants. Moreover,
most of these additional migrants originated from developing countries. The exodus of
skilled workers from developing countries is however feared to have severe consequences
on already poor economies, since it deprives them from their most talented labor force.
While the early theoretical literature of the 60s pointed out that a brain drain has
basically no impact on migrants’ origin countries and should not be a cause for worry
(Grubel and Scott, 1966), during the 70s economists, and foremost Bhagwati and Hamada
(1974), stressed that skilled emigration induces a negative externality on sending countries
and that “there is a loss to those left behind”. In recent years, economists took a fresh
look at the issue and highlighted a range of positive side-effects of skilled emigration.
One major beneficial externality of a brain drain is that it induces greater incentives for
individuals to educate because of a higher expected skill premium. Then, if the newly
educated individuals outweigh the ones leaving the country, human capital at origin is
enhanced compared to a situation without a brain drain (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al.,
1997; Beine et al., 2001), which may act as a substitute for educational subsidies (Stark
and Wang, 2002).1 However these migration models take population as constant and do
1In an extensive survey, Docquier (2006) describes the different positive externalities linked to skilled
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not analyse fertility decisions. In fact, an important literature shows that the decisions
parents face in terms of fertility and of investment in the education of their children are
central for a country’s economic development, see for instance Becker and Barro (1988)
as well as de la Croix and Doepke (2003). Since the quality-quantity trade-off in terms of
children influences human capital formation, it is crucial for a country’s economic growth
and it seems straightforward to study the impact of emigration within an endogenous
fertility model. To our knowledge, only the migration model of Chen (2006) features
endogenous fertility, but restricted to the brain drain issue. He analyzes the difference
between public and private funded education systems in a model where agents have an
average human capital level and a stochastic probability to emigrate. Our study differs
in terms of the aim and of the framework used.
This paper analyzes how high and low skilled emigration shape parents’ fertility choices
and thus human capital formation. Contrarily to most endogenous fertility models, indi-
viduals do not decide upon the total number of their children and their education level (or
investment in their education), but directly about how many low and high skilled children
they would like to have. This is also a major contrast to Chen (2006) and allows us to ex-
plicitely introduce skill heterogeneity among agents in our overlapping generations (OLG)
model. Also the end of their childhood, individuals migrate with a certain probability and
remit to their retired parents. This is another distinct feature from Chen, since remitting
behavior may influence the expected return of raising and/or educating children and thus
adults’ fertility decisions. It is shown that a brain drain induces parents to have more
high and less low educated children, but may either raise or reduce fertility (total number
of their offspring). A necessary condition to experience a decline in fertility due to skilled
emigration is that a parent’s (relative) cost must be higher than her (relative) expected
utility gain from raising a high educated child. In contrast, a sufficient condition to have
a higher fertility due to a brain drain is that this condition is reversed i.e. the cost of
raising a high educated child is smaller than the gain. Low skilled emigration leads to
reversed results: less high and more low skilled children. Finally, the impact of migration
on human capital is ambiguous.
To provide more concrete findings, the model is calibrated on the Phillipines, which
is an economy open to migration and experiencing large inflows of remittances. It is
emigration.
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found that increased high skilled emigration reduces fertility and fosters human capital
accumulation, while low skilled emigration induces higher population growth and a lower
level of education. More precisely, a permanent increase of 10% in emigration flows is
simulated. When the additional emigrants are high skilled (low skilled), the share of
high skilled in the work force changes from 22.2% to 28.4% (to 21.2%) and the annual
population growth from 1.98% to 1.36% (to 2.1%).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and explains the
theoretical effects of increased emigration. The illustration on the Phillipines economy is
presented in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Economic Model
We consider an overlapping generation economy where individuals live for 3 periods:
childhood, adulthood and old age. Each individual has one parent, which creates the
connection between generations. Individuals have either a low (superscript l) or a high
education level (superscript h). Higher education is costly, while lower education is offered
for free by the society.2. During their childhood, individuals who attend school do not
work, whether they obtain higher education or not. Also, agents work only in their
adulthood and earn a wage that depends on their education level. High skilled adults
earn a wage wh, while low skilled ones a wage wl with wh > wl.
We consider a small open economy where capital is perfectly mobile, which implies a
fixed international interest rate R∗. Also, both high and low skilled wages are exogenous
and constant. Both low and high skilled labor in this small open economy can emigrate
to an advanced economy and earn a higher salary, w∗i (i = h, l), which is exogenously
given with w∗i > wi. Finally, we assume that emigration is not large enough to affect the
economy of the destination country.
2For instance, individuals with a college degree could be considered as high skilled and individuals
without a college degree as low skilled. Then education after high school would be costly, while educatio
below college level would be free.
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2.1 Individual behavior
All decisions are made by the individual during her adulthood. Thus at time t, each
adult with education level i cares about her own old age consumption Dit+1 and about
the expected income of her children, V it+1. It is assumed that individuals consume only
when old. Thus there is no arbitrage opportunity for consumption, which is purchased
through savings and remittances. The individual also cares about the return from her
“education investment”, that is, the expected income of her children V it+1, which represents
the altruistic component in the utility. Moreover, an adult chooses how many low (nit)
and high skilled children (mit) she would like to have.
At the beginning of their adulthood, individuals with education level i can emigrate
with a probability pi, i = h, l to a more advanced economy. Hence the expected income
of a child with education level i = h, l is
wi = (1− pi)wi + piw∗i, i = h, l. (1)
Raising one child takes time fraction φ ∈ (0, 1) of an adult’s time and high skilled
children induce an additional cost for their education x. Therefore savings, Sit+1, result
from an adult’s labor earnings minus raising and educational costs of her children,
Sit+1 = R
∗[wi(1− φ(nit +m
i
t))]− xm
i
t, (2)
where in the following we normalize the fixed constant interest rate R∗ to 1.
It is assumed that all children care about their parents and remit a proportion of their
(foreign) income to their parents. Therefore for a parent of education i expected transfers,
Ωi, from her high and low skilled children are given by
Ωit+1 = T
i
t+1 + Z
i
t+1 = θ
hwhmit + θ
lwlnit, (3)
which comprise not only money transmitted by adults staying in the home country to
their parents, T it = (1 − p
l)θlwlni + (1− ph)θhwhmi, but also remittances, Z, defined as
Z it = p
lθlw∗lni + phθhw∗hmi. Then θi(> 0) is the propensity to transfer money to her
parents for an individual with education level i (or to remit for a migrant with education
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level i).
Lifetime consumption writes as follows
Dit+1 = S
i
t+1 + Ω
i
t+1. (4)
The utility function of an individual who is an adult with education level i at time t is
then given by:
U(Dit+1, V
i
t+1) = ln(D
i
t+1) + ln(V
i
t+1), (5)
and
V it+1 = α(n
i)ǫwl + (1− α)(mi)ǫwh.
A part from the fact that we explicity introduce heterogeneity among the types of children,
the non-linear term in V it+1 is similar to Becker and Barro (1988); Barro and Becker (1989);
Doepke (2005), with α ∈ (0, 1) measuring the weight given to low skilled children and
ǫ ∈ (0, 1) playing the role of the elasticity of the utility to any type of children. As
mentioned by Barro and Becker (1989), this form of the altruism term means that, for a
given expected income per child wi, “parental utility U(·) increases, but at a diminishing
rate, with the number of children” (here ni and mi).
Thus, combining the above informations, each adult is facing the following problem
max
ni,mi
U i = max
ni,mi
{ln(Dit+1) + ln(V
i
t+1)}, i = l, h, (6)
subject to (4) and which consists into the maximization of her lifetime utility by choosing
the number of low (ni) and high skilled children (mi).
2.2 Solving the individual problem
In appendix, we show that the first order condition of U i with respect to nit is
φwit − θ
lwlt+1
Dit+1
=
αwlt+1ǫ(n
i
t)
ǫ−1
V it+1
, (7)
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which states that the net marginal cost of raising a low skilled child, φwit − θ
lwlt+1 (cost
minus expected transfers), in terms of consumption, should equal the marginal utility gain
from a low skilled child’s expected income, in terms of the future value of total children
(V ). If this equality does not hold, raising children is either too costly (it is then optimal
to have no children), or not costly enough (then individuals choose to have more and more
children).
Similarly, the first order condition of U i with respect to mit shows that
φwit + x− θ
hwht+1
Dit+1
=
(1− α)wht+1ǫ(m
i
t)
ǫ−1
V it+1
, (8)
which reads that the net marginal cost of educating one child in terms of consumption
(left hand side) should be equal to the marginal benefit from educating a child.
The second order conditions of the agents’ maximization problem are satisfied. There-
fore the solutions from (7) and (8) are optimal for the household problem.
It is easy to see that in (7) and (8), both the right hand sides are positive, implying
that the left hand sides are positive also. These are necessary conditions for the existence
of interior solutions and it is assumed that, in what follows, these conditions always hold.
Assumption 1. The following conditions are supposed to always hold (for i = l, h
and ∀t),
φwit > θ
lwlt+1,
φwit + x > θ
hwht+1.
Assumption 1 guarantees that raising children is expensive, otherwise parents will
have as many children as they can; at the same time, educating children is also costly,
otherwise all children will get higher education.
Combining these two equations (see appendix), we obtain explicit solutions for m and
n, which are put forward in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1 we have
mit =
ǫ(1− α)wht+1w
i
t
(1 + ǫ)
[
φwit + x− θ
hwht+1
] [
αwlt+1σ
i
n,m + (1− α)w
h
t+1
] (9)
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and
nit = (σ
i
n,m)
1
ǫmit, (10)
where
σin,m =
(
Bt
Ait
) ǫ
1−ǫ
, with Ait =
φwit − θ
lwlt+1
φwit + x− θ
hwht+1
, Bt =
αwlt+1
(1− α)wht+1
. (11)
In fact Ait represents the ratio of net costs of raising a low to a high educated child
(see (7) and (8)), while Bt is the ratio of the contribution of a low educated child to a
high educated child in parental utility. Also, if ǫ is the elasticity of the utility to any type
of children, then σin,m can be considered as the elasticity of substitution between high and
low educated children in each household.
Given the explicit expression of mi and ni, we can study the change in these two
choice variables with respect to a change in ph. In the appendix we prove the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Under assumption 1 the number of high educated children is an increasing
function of the skilled migration probability ph, while number of low educated children is
a decreasing function of ph. Mathematically, we have
∂mit
∂ph
> 0,
∂nit
∂ph
< 0, ∀t, i = l, h.
The intuition of this proposition is very clear: a brain drain would lead to a trade-off
between high and low skilled children which is in favor of an increase in the number of
the former. However, the impact of a rise in ph on the total number of children, nit +m
i
t,
is not so clear. Nevertheless, we have the following results by combining equations (28),
(29), and (30) in appendix.
Proposition 4. Assume Assumption 1 holds.
(i) The effect of ph on fertility, nit +m
i
t, is ambiguous.
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(ii) One necessary condition for a decline in fertility, ∂(nit +m
i
t)/∂p
h < 0, is
mit
(
φwi + x− θhwh
)
(mit + n
i
t)
(
φwi − θlwl
) > ǫ(1− α)wh
αwlσin,m + (1− α)w
h
, (12)
where the right hand side is increasing in wh.
(iii) Furthermore, the other direction of the above inequality offers a sufficient condition
to have an increase in the total number of children following a rise in ph.
The above proposition can be commented as follows. It is almost that a rise in the
skilled probability to emigrate ph leads to an ambiguous effect on the total number of
children since the number of low educated children decreases and the one of high educated
children increases (point (i) in proposition 4).
However the necessary condition (12) under point (ii) of proposition 4 delivers some
insights on when a brain drain leads to a decline in fertility. First, notice that the right
hand side of the necessary condition is the ratio of a parent’s utility value from a high
skilled child’s expected income, (1− α)wh, to a parent’s utility from an “average” child,
αwlσin,m+(1−α)w
h, by taking into account the two elasticities, ǫ and σin,m. Secondly, the
left hand side of the necessary condition stands for the ratio of net education costs of all
high educated children to net raising costs of low skilled children applied to all children
(recall (8) and (7)). Hence, the necessary condition can be understood in a quite intuitive
way: a brain drain leads parents to have less children if the relative cost of raising a
high skilled child is higher than its relative marginal gain. More precisely, if the ratio of
educational to raising costs (LHS) is higher than the ratio of the marginal utility gain from
a high skilled child to the one from an “average” child (RHS). Two factors strenghten the
inequality in (12). Having a large share of high educated to total children m
i
ni+mi
, which
hinges on parents’ choices, and/or facing elevated exogenous education fees x contribute
in having too high relative raising costs of high skilled children.
The interpretation of the sufficient condition in point (iii) is now straightforward. If
the relative raising costs of high skilled children are too low, then a brain drain induces
that the number of additional high educated children dominates the reduction in the
number of low educated children. Thus fertility increases after a rise in ph.
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Finally, due to the symmetry of the effects of pl and ph on ni and mi, the same
calculations lead us to the following corollary
Corollary 1. Assume Assumption 1 holds. Then mit is decreasing and n
i
t is increasing
in pl, while the effect on the total number of children is ambiguous.
2.3 The impact of a brain drain on human capital
From the previous section, we know that parents choose to have more high and less low
skilled children, which acts positively on the formation of human capital. However, a
brain drain means also that more high skilled people leave. Thus which effect dominates?
Human capital at time t, denoted by Ht, can be defined as the share of high educated
labor in the total active labor force. That is
Ht =
Nht
Nht +N
l
t
, (13)
where Nht and N
l
t are respectively the high and low skilled active labor forces at time t,
defined as
N lt = (1− p
l)(N lt−1n
l
t−1 +N
h
t−1n
h
t−1), (14)
Nht = (1− p
h)(N lt−1m
l
t−1 +N
h
t−1m
h
t−1). (15)
Thus N lt(N
h
t ) are the low (high) skilled individuals born at time t − 1 from both low
skilled family and high skilled family and staying in their home country.
Therefore in order to study the effect of a change of ph on human capital, that is ∂Ht
∂ph
,
we only need to study the effect of ph on 1
Ht
= 1 +
N lt
Nht
.
Case I. If ph varies at time t and there is no perfect foresight, then all N lt−1, n
l
t−1,
Nht−1, n
h
t−1, m
l
t−1 and m
h
t−1 are independent of a change in p
h. Therefore, it follows that
∂
∂ph
(
N lt
Nht
)
=
(
N lt
Nht
)
1
(1− ph)
> 0,
9
that is,
∂
∂ph
(
1
Ht
)
> 0.
As a result, we have
∂Ht
∂ph
< 0, (16)
which means that if there is no information about a policy change concerning in ph, then
parents are not prepared for it and will not send more children to obtain higher education
following a brain drain. The result is that more high skilled workers emigrate without
inducing any additional formation of human capital.
Case II. There is perfect foresight and parents are prepared for the change in ph that
happens in the next period. Imagine that at time t + 1, ph increases. Direct calculation
shows
∂
∂ph
(
N lt+1
Nht+1
)
= G(n,m)
(1− pl)
(1− ph)2
+
(1− pl)
(1− ph)
∂G(n,m)
∂ph
, (17)
where
G(n,m) =
N ltn
l
t +N
h
t n
h
t
N ltm
l
t +N
h
t m
h
t
.
We know that bothml andmh (nl and nh) are increasing (decreasing) in terms of ph. Thus
a higher ph will lead to a rise in the denominator and to a reduction in the numerator,
while N lt and N
h
t are decided at time t − 1 and will thus not be affected by a change in
ph happening at time t+ 1. Hence we obtain
∂G(n,m)
∂ph
< 0.
To conclude, the first term on the right hand side of (17) is positive and represents the
ex post loss of human capital due to a brain drain, while the second term on the RHS
stands for the ex ante stimulation of human capital due to a brain drain. Since these two
effects also depend on the population size N lt and N
h
t , it is open to question whether at
the end a brain drain results in a brain loss or in a brain gain within our endogenous
fertility model. A calibration of our model on a situation of a typical developing country
open to labor mobility may give us a specific answer.
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3 Numerical Analysis
In this section we provide a numerical illustration to analyze the effects of increased
emigration on fertility and human capital. Higher migration can be due to the fact that
destination countries adopt more liberal immigration policies. Since immigration policies
tend to be more and more skilled-biased, we first focus on the effects of higher high skilled
emigration. Consecutively, we compare the findings with a situation of increased low
skilled migration.
3.1 Calibration
Our model is calibrated to depict a typical situation of South-North migration and as
such the parameter of our model are adjusted to match the economy of the Philippines
(to be the migrants’ origin country). This choice seems appropriate since international
migration and large flows of remittances are notorious characteristics of the Philippine
economy for several decades now (see the IMF study of Burgess and Haksar, 2005). The
foreign country of the model, is represented by a combination of OECD countries, where
the importance of each of them is weighted by the share of Filipino emigrants they host
(see below). The initial steady state is assumed to correspond to 2000 data. The values
of parameters and exogenous variables are reported in table 1 and chosen as follows.
Table 1: Parameter values for the Philippines
φ = 0.15 ǫ = 0.5 wl = 1 wh = 5.022 ph = 0.086 pl = 0.043
α = 0.62 θl = 0.1 w∗l = 1.96 w∗h = 29.29 xlt = 0.92 R
∗ = 1.806
According to Haveman and Wolfe (1995) parents spend around 15% of their time
raising children, which enables us to set the raising cost parameter φ to 0.15. Also,
following Rosenzweig (2006) the wage of a high skilled worker in the Philippines is 5.022
times larger than the one of a low skilled. Thus if wl is set to 1, wh equals 5.022. Since
one period is considered to be 20 years, the interest factor is set to R∗ = 1.806 which
corresponds to an annual interest rate of 3%.
11
A next step is to choose the probabilities to emigrate, ph and pl, which are not directly
observable. However, Docquier and Marfouk (2006) document that 67% of the Filipinos
living in OECD in 2000 are skilled, thus we can set ph = 2 pl. Also, since one period
lasts 20 years, it can be considered that the number of migrants in the OECD in 2000
reported by these authors represents the number of emigrants during one period in our
model, meaning that 1’678’735 Filipinos go abroad. 3. If the number of migrants can be
written as plN l+phNh then taking N l and Nh from Docquier and Marfouk, we have that
pl = 0.043094295 and ph = 0.08618859.
For the remaining exogenous variables no data are available. To start with, the pa-
rameter ǫ in the “altruistic” argument of the utility function is set to 0.5, but will be
subject to several robustness checks in a later section. Remaining variables are set in
order to match four main characteristics of the Philippine economy. Let us now describe
this procedure. First, we know from Docquier and Marfouk (2006), which themselves rely
on the data of Barro and Lee (2001), that in 2000 the ratio of the low-to-high skilled
labor force, 1/h (= N l/Nh), amounts to 3.5045. This value is met by fixing the edu-
cation costs of a child to xlt = 0.917045 and by the plausible assumption that x
h = xl.
Second, if we consider one period to be 20 years, then population growth in our model
equals g = 1.481, implying that α = 0.621093. Moreover, we can consider the wage
differential between the Phillipines and the OECD to be similar to the per capita GDP
differential. According to the World Development Indicators WDI (2003), average per
capita GDP between 1999-2004 was $3’991 in the Philippines and $34’268 in the OECD
(PPP, constant 2000 international $), thus 7.98 times higher in the OECD.4 If aver-
age domestic wage is defined as ŵ = (wh + 1/hwl)/(1 + 1/h) and average foreign wage
ŵ∗ = (w∗h + 1/h∗w∗l)/(1 + 1/h∗), then the average wage difference ω = ŵ∗/ŵ equals
3This number is not exaggerated, because when considering also temporary residents (42%) and ir-
regular migrants (21%) together with permanent residents (37%), the number of Filipinos living and
working overseas was estimated to be around 7.58 million in 2002 with an increase of 1 million since
1996. This number is equivalent to almost one quarter of the domestic labor force (Burgess and Haksar,
2005; Castro, 2006)
4According to Docquier and Marfouk, migrants from the Phillipines living in the OECD in 2000 were
distributed as follows: United States (69.31%), Canada (11.41%), Australia (4.65%), Japan (4.56%),
Italy (2.44%), United Kingdom (2.07%), Germany (0.75%), Korea (0.72%), Spain (0.67%), New Zealand
(0.51%), Austria (0.45%), Switzerland (0.43%), Netherlands (0.34%), Greece (0.29%), France (0.28%),
Norway (0.25%), Sweden (0.23%), Ireland (0.21%), Denmark (0.15%), Belgium (0.13%), Iceland (0.04%),
Mexico (0.04%), Finland (0.037%), Czech Republic (0.0014%), Hungary (0.001%), Slovakia (0.0001%).
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7.98. Relying on the same sources as for the domestic economy and applying the same
weights for the distribution of migrants among OECD countries as for GDP per capita,
the average ratio of low-to-high skilled labor force in the OECD, 1/h∗, was 1.096703272
and the skill premium, w∗h/w∗l, 13.78465156. Then to match the average wage difference,
w∗h is required to be 29.2902, while w∗l = 13.78 w∗h. Finally, we need to set the propen-
sities to remit θl and θh. While skilled migrants remit a larger amount than low educated
migrants, recent research claims taht their propensity to remit is lower than the one of
low skilled migrants, see Faini (2007) and Nimii et al. (2008). In our central scenario it
is assumed that the propensity to remit of the skilled is 50% as much as the low skilled
one and thus θh = 0.5 θl. This assumption will be subject to robustness checks. Based
on Fund staff estimates and on the World Bank, indicate that remittances in percentage
of GDP amount to 9.4%. If we define GDP, Y , by the sum of incomes from labor and
savings, then Yt = N
h
t w
h
t + N
lwlt + (R
∗ − 1)(Nht−1s
h
t−1 +N
l
t−1s
l
t−1) and the total amount
of remittances in one period, Λ, by Λt = N
h
t−1Z
h
t + N
l
t−1Z
l
t. Then Λt/Yt = 0.094 implies
that θl = 0.103657.5
3.2 Results
We analyze the effects of a permanent increase of 10% in emigration flows, which means
that an additional 164 thousand migrants are leaving the Phillipines at each period with
respect to the baseline. Two scenarios are compared. Under the high skilled emigra-
tion scenario, additional migrants are all skilled and thus ph rises from 0.086 to 0.109.
Conversely, under the low skilled emigration, additional migrants are low skilled and pl
changes from 0.043 to 0.05.
Figure 1 shows how the choices of the households are influenced by the adoption of
increased high skilled emigration. As expected from our theoretical results, households
choose to finance higher education to a larger number of children and to raise less low
skilled children (columns 1 and 2). While theoretically the effect of ph on total children
was ambiguous, we can see now from column 3, that low skilled parents would prefer to
5According to aggregate data on remittances from the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2007)
remittances amount to $7876 million in 2003. Moreover a more recent report of the WorldBank (2006)
indicates that the remittances share of GDP in the Philippines would even amount to 13.5% (see World
Bank, 2006, p.90, Figure 4.1).
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Figure 1: Impact of increased high skilled emigration on households’ decisions
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Values display percentage changes with respect to the baseline.
“l” refers to low and “h” to high skilled individuals.
have less children, while high skilled raise slighty more children. Thus an increase in the
probability to emigrate reduces fertility. What about human capital? The effect of a
brain drain on human capital H is (slightly) negative in the short run (when the policy
is adopted). However the additional children having obtained higher education thanks
to the new policy, will add to the high skilled labor force and more than compensate for
the departing high educated workers. Moreover, we can see that the growth rate of the
high skilled population initially declines, because of the departure of skilled workers in
the first period. Shorthly after, it augments since both types of parents opt for more
skilled children. This short term rise happens only for the growth rate of the high skilled
population (the one of the low skilled is not shown). In the long run, the growth rate of
the high and low skilled populations are the same and stabilize at a lower level compared
to the baseline. A doubling of the migration flows in which addtional emigrants are all
highly educated leads, in the long run, to a 27.80% rise in human capital (i.e. H rises
from 22.2% to 28.4%) and to a 8.47% decrease in population growth rate (which means
that the annual population growth rate declines from 1.98% to 1.36%).
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Figure 2: Impact of increased high skilled emigration on welfare
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Values display percentage changes with respect to the baseline.
“l” refers to low and “h” to high skilled individuals.
Figure 2 points at the impact on other economic indicators,for instance, at remittances
per high (Zh) and per low skilled parent/receiver (Z l), total remittances (Λ) and average
remittances per receiver (Z) defined as
Λt = N
h
t−1Z
h
t +N
l
t−1Z
l
t,
Ωt =
Λt
(Nht−1 +N
l
t−1)
.
We also look at the impact on average utility (U) and average utility from consumption
(Ψ):
U t =
Nht−1U
h
t +N
l
t−1U
l
t
Nht−1 +N
l
t−1
,
Ψt =
Nht−1ln(D
h
t ) +N
l
t−1ln(D
l
t)
Nht−1 +N
l
t−1
.
Moreover, the ratio of the high-to-low skilled utilities (Ξ) or of high-to-low skilled utilities
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Figure 3: Impact of increased low skilled emigration on households’ decisions
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Values display percentage changes with respect to the baseline.
“l” refers to low and “h” to high skilled individuals.
from consumption (Π) can be considered as indicators of inter-household inequality:
Ξt =
Uht
U lt
,
Πt =
ln(Dht )
ln(Dlt)
.
While total remittances and average remittances received rise in the long run (column 2),
average remittances received by each skill group behave differently (column 1). Obviously
in the first period average remittances for both skill groups rise when more individuals
leave the country. However, in the long run remittances for low skilled individuals are de-
creased, because the remittances received by their additional high skilled children do not
compensate for the remittances foregone by raising less low skilled children. In contrast,
skilled parents benefit from higher per capita remittances. In column 3, skilled emigration
has only a slight impact on average utility of high skilled individuals but raises consider-
ably the one of low skilled ones. Then average per capita utility will rise and the welfare
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of low compared to high skilled individuals will improve (column 4).
Figure 4: Impact of increased low skilled emigration on welfare
0 5 10 15
−5
−2.5
0
2.5
5
remittances h
0 5 10 15
−5
−2.5
0
2.5
5
remittances l
0 5 10 15
−5
−2.5
0
2.5
5
total remittances
0 5 10 15
−5
−2.5
0
2.5
5
rem per recipient
0 5 10 15
−2
−1
0
1
2
utility h
0 5 10 15
−2
−1
0
1
2
utility l
0 5 10 15
−2
−1
0
1
2
average utility
0 5 10 15
−2
−1
0
1
2
utility h/l
0 5 10 15
−5
−2.5
0
2.5
5
average cons
0 5 10 15
−5
−2.5
0
2.5
5
consumption h/l
Values display percentage changes with respect to the baseline.
“l” refers to low and “h” to high skilled individuals.
These latter results are explained by the “altruistic” component of the utility. In fact,
if we consider welfare to be measured only by the consumption part of the utility, ln(Di),
then average utility per skill group will have only a temporary impact. The ratio of
high-to-low skilled utilities from consumption, Πt, will decline in the first period (bottom
graph in column 5) because utility from consumption of a high skilled individual, ln(Dh),
decreases more than the utility from consumption of low skilled individuals. Finally,
average utility from consumption, Ψt, rises also in the long run because more and more
people become high skilled and enjoy a higher utility.
Figure 3 depicts the effects on households’ fertility decisions when additional migrants
are low skilled. From the theoretical analysis, we know that the choices on the number
of high and low skilled children are upturned compared to a brain drain. Such a policy
will also lead to an increase in fertility (column 3). Moreover, the impact on fertility
and human capital is not only reversed, but also of much smaller magnitude than under
high skilled emigration. Increased unskilled emigration induces, in the long run, a drop of
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4.46% in human capital (H goes from 22.2% to 21.2%) and a rise of 7.15% in population
growth (the annual growth rate changes from 1.98 to 2.1%). Figure 4 shows the effect of
such a policy on welfare indicators. Similarly to a brain drain, higher unskilled emigration
leads to more remittances. But the rise is less strong in the long run than with a brain
drain. The reason is that because of the low-skilled biased emigration policy and because
parents choose to finance higher education to less children, there are less high skilled
emigrants, who remit higher amounts. It can also be observed that in contrast to the
brain drain scenario, low skilled parents benefit on average from higher remittances. In
both scenarios, the utility of low skilled individuals rises in absolute terms (bottom graph
in column 3) and relatively to skilled individuals (bottom graph in column 4).
3.3 Robustness
Are the above findings consistent with migrants’ remittances behavior and with the choice
of ǫ? Figure 5 reports the impact of high skilled emigration on human capital formation
and population growth when low skilled migrants have a higher propensity to remit (i.e.
the central scenario when θh = 0.5θl), when both types of individuals have equal propen-
sities to remit (θh = θl) and when no remittances are sent back (Λ = 0).6 The effects on
human capital and population growth are robust under these different scenarios. When
high skilled remit in the same propensity as low skilled, more remittances are sent back
(see table 2) and thus the incentives to send more children to get education are higher.
It results that human capital is more improved than in the benchmark. However, in the
absence of remittances, human capital is nevertheless enhanced (even though less than
in the other two scenarios), because parents are altruistic and prefer having more high
skilled children because these ones enjoy a higher expected wage. In terms of population
growth, the scenario in which both high and low skilled remit in the same way has a less
reducing impact than the benchmark. The reason is that since high skilled migrants remit
more, the number of skilled children is further stimulated and the decrease in population
growth is dampened (see table 2).When there is no perspective of remittances, low skilled
children are relatively more ineresting in the “no remittances” scenario than in the other
6For each alternative baseline, the different exogenous variables are recalibrated to meet the charac-
teristics of the Philippine economy.
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two scenarios. Then the decline in the number of low skilled children is less important
and the effect on population growth reduced.
Figure 5: Impact of skilled emigration under alternative behaviors to remit
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Figure 6: Impact of unskilled emigration under alternative behaviors to remit
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Figure 6 shows the effect of increased low skilled emigration. The scenario with the
same remitting behavior for high and low skilled leads to an inferior reduction in human
capital than the benchmark. Under the latter scenario low skilled remit more than when
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θh = θl, and thus parents react stronger to a rise in pl. This also explains the higher
increase in population growth. The absence of remittances leads to a slight reduction in
population growth, because low skilled parents do not react by a strong increase in the
number of low skilled children, since these ones do not repay them with any remittances.
Finally, figures 7 and 8 in appendix show that the results of larger emigration on human
capital formation and population growth are robust to a choice of ǫ (for ǫ equal to 0.25
and 0.75).
4 Conclusion
An endogenous fertility model with overlapping generations is introduced, where parents
choose the number of low and high educated children they would like to raise. We analyze
the impact of high and low skilled emigration on parents’ fertility choices and on human
capital. It is shown that a brain drain induces parents to support higher education
of a larger number of their children and to raise less low skilled ones. Furthermore, a
necessary condition to see a decline in the total number of children is that the relative
cost of financing children’s higher education is larger than its expected gain. Low skilled
emigration leads to contrary results. The impact of either type of emigration on human
capital is ambiguous.
Finally, the model is calibrated on the Phillipines to provide some quantitative results.
We simulate an increase of 10% in emigration flows. When these additional migrants are
high skilled, human capital is enhanced in the long run (increase of 27.8% in the share
of high skilled individuals) and population growth experiences a slow down (from 1.98%
to 1.36% annual growth). Alternatively, when the “new” emigrants are low skilled, the
impact is reversed and of a lower magnitude: the level of human capital is exacerbated
(drop of 4.46%) and population growth stimulated (from 1.98% to 2.1%).
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A Appendix
A.1 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
The explicit solutions for ni and mi are obtained in two steps. We first compute the linear
relationship between ni and mi, and find the explicit solution mi.
Step 1. The relationship between ni and mi
By substituting teh equation of wi into the utility function and the ones of Sit+1 and
Ωit+1 into D
i
t+1, we are facing the following optimization problem
max
ni,mi
U it = max
ni,mi
[
ln(Dit+1) + ln(V
i
t+1)
]
,
with
Dit+1 =
[
wit
(
1− φ(nit +m
i
t)
)
− xmit
]
+
[
wht+1θ
hmit + w
l
t+1θ
lnit
]
, (18)
and
V it+1 = w
l
t+1α(n
i
t)
ǫ + wht+1(1− α)(m
i
t)
ǫ, (19)
First order condition of U i with respect to nit reads
−φwit + θ
lwlt+1
Dit+1
+
αwlt+1ǫ(n
i
t)
ǫ−1
V it+1
= 0,
which is equivalent to
φwit − θ
lwlt+1
Dit+1
=
αwlt+1ǫ(n
i
t)
ǫ−1
V it+1
. (20)
Similarly, the first order condition of U i with respect to mit shows
−φwit − x+ θ
hwht+1
Dit+1
+
(1− α)wht+1ǫ(m
i
t)
ǫ−1
V it+1
= 0,
which is the same as
φwit + x− θ
hwht+1
Dit+1
=
(1− α)wht+1ǫ(m
i
t)
ǫ−1
V it+1
. (21)
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Dividing (7) by (8), we obtain
φwit − θ
lwlt+1
φwit + x− θ
hwht+1
=
αwlt+1(n
i
t)
ǫ−1
(1− α)wht+1(m
i
t)
ǫ−1
.
Denote
Ait =
φwit − θ
lwlt+1
φwit + x− θ
hwht+1
, Bt =
αwlt+1
(1− α)wht+1
.
Hence, we obtain
nit =
(
Bt
Ait
) 1
1−ǫ
mit, or (n
i
t)
ǫ−1 =
(
Ait
Bt
)
(mit)
ǫ−1. (22)
Step 2. Obtaining mi
By rewriting (7) as follows
(
φwit − θ
lwlt+1
)
V it+1 = αǫw
l
t+1(n
i
t)
ǫ−1Dit+1,
using (18) and (19), and rearranging the terms, yields
λα(1 + ǫ)wlt+1(n
i
t)
ǫ = αǫwlt+1(n
i
t)
ǫ−1
[
wit − Γ
i
1m
i
t
]
− λ(1− α)wht+1(m
i
t)
ǫ. (23)
with λ = φwit − θ
lwlt+1 and Γ
i
1 = φw
i
t + x− θ
hwht+1.
When substituting (22) into the right hand side of (23) and after rearranging the
terms, we obtain
α(1 + ǫ)wlt+1(n
i
t)
ǫ =
(1− α)ǫwht+1
φwit + x− θ
hwht+1
wit(m
i
t)
ǫ−1 − (1− α)(1 + ǫ)wht+1(m
i
t)
ǫ. (24)
Using (22) again and rearranging terms, yields
(1 + ǫ)
(
αwlt+1σ
i
n,m + (1− α)w
h
t+1
)
mitw
h
t+1 =
ǫ(1− α)wht+1
φwit + x− θ
hwht+1
wit, (25)
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where σin,m =
(
Bt
Ait
) ǫ
1−ǫ
.
Hence mit can be explicitly rewritten as
mit =
ǫ(1− α)wht+1w
i
t
(1 + ǫ)
[
φwit + x− θ
hwht+1
] [
αwlt+1σ
i
n,m + (1− α)w
h
t+1
] .
Finally, due to (22) and (9), we have
nit = (σ
i
n,m)
1
ǫmit.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3
This proof can be established in three steps. In step 1, the effect of ph on the elasticity
of substitution σin,m is computed. Step 2 shows that m
i is an increasing function of ph,
while step 3 demonstrates that ni is decreasing in ph.
Step 1. Elasticity σin,m is decreasing in p
h.
Taking logarithm of σin,m =
(
Bt
Ait
) ǫ
1−ǫ
, it follows
ln(σin,m) =
ǫ
1− ǫ
ln
(
Bt
Ait
)
.
Thus
1
σin,m
∂σin,m
∂ph
=
ǫ
1− ǫ
Ait
Bt
∂
∂ph
(
Bt
Ait
)
,
and
sign
(
∂σin,m
∂ph
)
= sign
(
∂
∂ph
(
Bt
Ait
))
,
due to the fact that ǫ
1−ǫ
> 0 and
Ait
Bt
> 0.
From the definition of Bt and A
i
t, we have that
Bt
Ait
=
αwlt+1
(1− α)(φwit − θ
lwlt+1)
(
φwit + x
wht+1
− θh
)
.
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By the definition of wht+1, it follows
∂
∂ph
(
Bt
Ait
)
=
αwlt+1
(1− α)(φwit − θ
lwlt+1)
[
−
φwit + x
(wht+1)
2
(
w∗h − wh
)]
< 0,
where we use the first order condition (or Assumption 1)
φwit + x > w
h
t+1, φw
i
t > w
l
t+1.
Therefore σin,m is decreasing in terms of p
h, or
∂σin,m
∂ph
< 0.
Step 2. mi is increasing in ph.
Denoting
Γi1 = φw
i
t + x− θ
hwht+1, Γ
i
2 = αw
l
t+1σ
i
n,m + (1− α)w
h
t+1, Γ
i = Γi1Γ
i
2,
and directly taking the derivative of (9) with respect to ph, yields
∂mit
∂ph
=
ǫ(1− α)wit
(1 + ǫ)Γ2
[
Γi
∂wht+1
∂ph
− Γi2w
h
t+1(−θ
h)
∂wht+1
∂ph
− Γi1w
h
t+1
(
αwlt+1
∂σin,m
∂ph
+ (1− α)
∂wht+1
∂ph
)]
.
Define
M i = Γi + Γi2θ
hwht+1 − Γ
i
1(1− α)w
h
t+1,
then
∂mit
∂ph
can be rewritten as
∂mit
∂ph
=
ǫ(1− α)wit
(1 + ǫ)Γ2
(
M i
∂wht+1
∂ph
− αΓi1w
h
t+1w
l
t+1
∂σin,m
∂ph
)
.
In step 1, we prove that
∂σin,m
∂ph
< 0, so the second terms in the right hand side is
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positive, and
∂wht+1
∂ph
= w∗h − wh > 0. Therefore, we only need to study the sign of M i.
From the above definition, it follows
M i =
(
φwi + x− θhwht+1
) (
αwlt+1σ
i
n,m + (1− α)w
h
t+1
)
+θhwht+1
(
αwlt+1σ
i
n,m + (1− α)w
h
t+1
)
−(1− α)wht+1
(
φwi + x− θhwht+1
)
=
(
φwi + x− θhwht+1
)
αwlt+1σ
i
n,m + θ
hwht+1
(
αwlt+1σ
i
n,m + (1− α)w
h
t+1
)
> 0.
Therefore, we obtain
∂mit
∂ph
> 0, ∀t, i = l, h. (26)
Step 3. nit is decreasing in p
h
( In the following, we omit the time subscript t.) Taking logarithm in (10), yields
ln(ni) =
1
ǫ
ln(σin,m) + ln(m
i).
Hence direct calculation shows
1
ni
∂ni
∂ph
=
1
ǫσin,m
∂σin,m
∂ph
+
1
mi
∂mi
∂ph
, (27)
where the fist term is negative and the second term is positive, therefore we continue the
analysis study to see which term dominates and determines the sign of ∂n
i
∂ph
.
It is easy to check that
1
mi
∂mi
∂ph
=
1
Γiwh
[
M i(w∗h − wh)− Γi1αw
hwl
∂σin,m
∂ph
]
=
M i(w∗h − wh)
Γiwh
−
αwl
Γi2
∂σin,m
∂ph
.
(28)
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Substituting (28) into (27), yields
1
ni
∂ni
∂ph
=
(
1
ǫσin,m
−
αwl
Γi2
)
∂σin,m
∂ph
+
M i(w∗h − wh)
Γiwh
. (29)
Denote
Φi =
1
ǫσin,m
−
αwl
Γi2
=
1
ǫσin,mΓ
i
2
(
Γi2 − αǫw
lσin,m
)
=
1
ǫσin,mΓ
i
2
(
(1− ǫ)αwlσin,m + (1− α)w
h
)
> 0.
Recall that
1
σin,m
∂σin,m
∂ph
=
ǫ
(1− ǫ)
Ai
B
∂
∂ph
(
B
Ai
)
=
ǫ
(1− ǫ)
Ai
B
α
(1− α)
wl
(φwi − θlwl)
(−1)
(φwi + x)(w∗h − wh)
(wh)2
,
where
Ai
B
=
(φwi − θlwl)
(φwi + x− θhwh)
(1− α)wh
αwl
.
Hence
1
σin,m
∂σin,m
∂ph
= −
ǫ
(1− ǫ)
(φwi + x)(w∗h − wh)
(φwi + x− θhwh)wh
. (30)
Substituting (30) into (29), it follows
1
ni
∂ni
∂ph
= −
(φwi + x)(w∗h − wh)(Γi2 − αǫσ
i
n,mw
l)
(1− ǫ)Γiwh
+
M i(w∗h − wh)
Γiwh
=
(w∗h − wh)
(1− ǫ)Γiwh
[
(1− ǫ)M i − (φwi + x)(Γi2 − αǫσ
i
n,mw
l)
]
,
(31)
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where
(φwi + x)(αǫσin,mw
l − Γi2) = (φw
i + x)
(
αǫσin,mw
l − ασin,m − (1− α)w
h
)
= −(φwi + x)(1− ǫ)ασin,mw
l − (φwi + x)(1− α)wh,
and
(1− ǫ)M i = (1− ǫ)
[
Γi2 + θ
hΓi2w
h − (1− α)Γi1w
h
]
= (1− ǫ)ασin,mΓ
i
1w
l + (1− ǫ)Γi2θ
hwh
= (1− ǫ)ασin,mw
l
[
(φwi + x)− θhwh
]
+ (1− ǫ)θhwh(αwlσin,m + (1− α)w
h)
= (φwi + x)(1− ǫ)ασin,mw
l + (1− ǫ)(1− α)θh(wh)2.
Hence,
1
ni
∂ni
∂ph
=
(1− α)(w∗h − wh)
(1− ǫ)Γi
[
(1− ǫ)θhwh − (φwi + x)
]

> 0, if (1− ǫ)θhwh > (φwi + x),
= 0, if (1− ǫ)θhwh = (φwi + x),
< 0, if (1− ǫ)θhwh < (φwi + x).
(32)
However, if Assumption 1 holds (i.e. the first order condition), then the first two cases
in (32) are not possible, and as a result, we have
∂nit
∂ph
< 0, ∀t, i = l, h. (33)
This finishes the proof.
29
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 4 (case ii)
Denote the right hand side of (12) as
F (wh) =
ǫ(1− α)wh
αwlσin,m + (1− α)w
h
.
And hence
1
F (wh)
=
αwlσin,m
ǫ(1− α)wh
+
1
ǫ
.
Moreover
d
dwh
(
1
F (wh)
)
= −
1
F 2(wh)
dF (wh)
dwh
=
αwl
ǫ(1− α)
(
wh
∂σin,m
∂wh
− σin,m
)
(
wh
)2 ,
where, by the definition of σin,m and by omitting subscript t for simplicity, leads to
∂σin,m
∂wh
=
ǫ
1− ǫ
(
B
A
) ǫ
1−ǫ
−1
1
A
[
−
B
wh
−
Bθh
φwi + x− θhwh
]
= −
ǫ
1− ǫ
σin,m
φwi + x
(φwi + x− θhwh)wh
< 0,
due to Assumption 1 and 0 < ǫ < 1.
Hence
d
dwh
(
1
F (wh)
)
< 0,
and
dF (wh)
dwh
> 0.
The proof is finished.
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Appendix D: Figures and tables of section 5.3.3
Figure 7: Impact of high skilled emigration for different values of ǫ
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Figure 8: Impact of low skilled emigration for different values of ǫ
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Table 2: Impact of an increase in ph under different variants
Impact on household decisions Variables Benchmark γh = γl Λ = 0 ǫ = 0.25 ǫ = 0.75
High skilled children of high skilled parents mh 2.09 3.96 5.36 5.10 1.04
High skilled children of low skilled parents ml 6.53 10.60 9.09 10.28 8.54
Low skilled children of high skilled parents nh -14.65 -14.23 -9.44 -8.07 -28.33
Low skilled children of low skilled parents nl -12.20 -11.00 -6.23 -7.51 -24.12
Total children of high skilled parents mh + nh 0.22 -0.28 -1.77 0.57 0.98
Total children of low skilled parents ml + nl -9.95 -8.40 -4.08 -4.77 -20.46
Savings of high skilled parents sh -0.88 -1.49 0.00 -0.77 -0.82
Savings of low skilled parents sl 1.61 -1.27 0.00 -1.07 -0.02
Human capital H 27.79 28.98 15.14 17.06 18.68
Growth rate of the population g -35.62 -28.87 -12.24 -18.81 -23.53
Impact on welfare
Remittances per high skilled receiver Zh 9.23 11.01 0.00 10.50 8.96
Remittances per low skilled receiver Zl -3.61 3.59 0.00 2.59 0.06
Total remittances Λ 26.98 37.22 0.00 18.20 19.49
Average remittances Z 3.38 14.07 0.00 5.58 4.47
Average utility U 13.26 14.49 9.15 7.90 8.79
Ratio of utilities (high to low skilled) Ξ -3.56 -3.69 -2.71 -2.60 -2.72
Average utility from consumption Ψ 18.31 19.09 9.97 8.42 10.08
Ratio of utilities from consumption Π 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 3: Impact of an increase in pl under different variants
Impact on household decisions Variables Benchmark γh = γl Λ = 0 ǫ = 0.25 ǫ = 0.75
High skilled children of high skilled parents mh -0.07 -0.18 -0.53 -0.24 0.00
High skilled children of low skilled parents ml -0.70 -0.78 -0.87 -0.53 -1.39
Low skilled children of high skilled parents nh 1.62 1.44 0.94 0.89 3.39
Low skilled children of low skilled parents nl 3.21 1.74 0.60 2.46 5.85
Total children of high skilled parents mh + nh 0.12 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.01
Total children of low skilled parents ml + nl 2.74 1.44 0.39 2.00 5.04
Savings of high skilled parents sh 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Savings of low skilled parents sl -1.11 -0.33 0.00 -0.73 -0.83
Human capital H -4.46 -2.26 -0.78 -2.44 -2.95
Growth rate of the population g 7.15 2.60 -0.69 4.32 4.95
Impact on welfare
Remittances per high skilled receiver Zh 0.02 -0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00
Remittances per low skilled receiver Zl 2.49 0.92 0.00 1.78 2.00
Total remittances Λ -2.12 -1.45 0.00 -0.84 -1.16
Average remittances Z 1.43 0.02 0.00 1.26 1.27
Average utility U -1.19 -0.51 0.07 -0.36 -0.55
Ratio of utilities (high to low skilled) Ξ -0.33 -0.41 -0.54 -0.27 -0.28
Average utility from consumption Ψ -2.94 -1.49 -0.51 -1.20 -1.59
Ratio of utilities from consumption Π 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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